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Abstract
We investigate the role of bank information policies in fostering the accumulation of financial
knowledge. Exploiting the exogenous variability induced by the presence of a consortium of
banks in Italy (PattiChiari), we find that these policies are effective for a small subsample
of the population (5-10%) and lead to an increase in financial literacy by about 10%, on
average. Compliance is highest among low-educated respondents older than 60 years. We
use these policies as an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of financial literacy on
financial assets. We find that one standard deviation increase in financial literacy determines
an increase in household financial assets by 35% of a standard deviation (8,000 euros). Effects
are heterogeneous in the population and highest among elderly low-educated households.
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1 Introduction
Both in Europe and in the US, there is evidence of low levels of financial literacy and a limited
knowledge of basic economic concepts, like inflation or interest compounding (Jappelli, 2010; Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2011c, 2014). Lack of financial literacy and the misperception of crucial economic
factors may lead individuals to make suboptimal investment choices and, thus, reduce individual
wealth and welfare. For this reason, actions to promote financial literacy in the population have
been implemented in a growing number of countries (see OECD (2013a) for a review). These
interventions mainly rely on the role of formal, financial education in schools or at the work place.1
In this paper we study a different channel that may improve financial literacy, which has been
almost neglected by the literature: bank information policies. To assess their effectiveness, we
exploit a peculiar feature of the Italian banking system, namely, the existence of a consortium of
banks, PattiChiari, which has the aim of enhancing banking transparency. Banks that entered the
PattiChiari Consortium had to provide to their customers information materials on basic economic
concepts (e.g., about compound interests, fixed/flexible interest rates, the calculation of debt re-
payment instalments, etc.) and more transparent information on current account expenditures.
These activities are in line with the OECD (2013b) suggestions for improving the effectiveness of
financial literacy programmes, as the informative material was provided on a regular basis in a
format and location that are easy to access (i.e., on the internet and/or at the local bank branch).
We argue that these information policies reduce the cost of acquiring (basic) financial knowledge
for customers without imposing any additional burden in terms of time, effort or resources to them.
We investigate to what extent information policies improve financial literacy. Evidence on absence
of self-selection of clients into PattiChiari banks allows us to overcome one of the main issues in
the evaluation of voluntary financial education programmes (OECD, 2013a) and to interpret our
findings as causal.
Our results suggest that bank information policies significantly affect the level of financial literacy
for a small sub-sample of the population (5-10%), being particularly effective on households whose
head is 60+ and low educated. The level of financial literacy is 10% higher, on average, among
PattiChiari clients than among non-PattiChiari clients, and this effect corresponds to about one-
1There is an open debate about the effectiveness of alternative financial education programmes on financial literacy
and financial behaviour (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; Willis, 2011). Robust and reliable empirical evidence on the
evaluation of their effects is still limited, and this motivates some skepticism on the role played by financial education
in improving financial knowledge and household financial welfare (Willis, 2011).
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fourth of a standard deviation of our measure of financial literacy. This result adds to the literature
aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of alternative interventions on financial literacy (Fernandes
et al., 2014; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Even though information policies may represent an
alternative way to improve financial knowledge, the limited number of people affected suggests that
they should be targeted towards individuals in this subsample: the low-educated elderly. Since
the positive impact of financial knowledge on financial assets turns out to be the highest in this
subsample, a targeted intervention might also be effective in increasing financial wealth, as we
discuss in the conclusions.
A second contribution of this paper is to provide a new instrumental-variable strategy to as-
sess the effect of financial literacy on financial assets, which exploits bank information policies for
identification. Even if the association between financial literacy and several economic decisions
(risk diversification, debt exposure and retirement planning) has been widely documented, evidence
about the strength of the causal relationship between these factors is recent and still limited. Most
studies report that regression correlations provide a lower bound of the true effect, but estimates of
this bias vary substantially. Unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b)
and measurement error (van Rooij et al., 2011) plague empirical results and are difficult to address.
In line with previous analyses, we show that the causal effect of financial literacy on financial assets
is underestimated by OLS correlation. We find that a one standard deviation increase in financial
literacy leads to an increase of household financial assets of around 8,000 euros (35% of a standard
deviation in financial assets). The effect of financial knowledge on financial assets is mainly driven
by households whose head is 60+ and low-educated. Moreover, the OLS bias turns out to be the
largest in this subsample, for which measurement error in financial literacy is likely to be larger. We
offer some insights about the channels through which this effect takes place, showing that house-
holds with higher financial literacy are more prone to participate in the stock market (Christelis
et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 2011, 2012) and, possibly, to hold a more-diversified portfolio. Con-
versely, we do not find evidence of a stronger attitude to plan for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2011a) or of a higher saving rate. Lack of adequate data prevents us from examining the effect of
financial literacy on the quality of financial decisions.
We refer to financial literacy as a broad concept that concerns basic economic notions of which
individuals should have some understanding when making even simple, day-to-day financial deci-
sions and which helps them to evaluate future scenarios (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b). To measure
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financial literacy, we follow previous literature (see, for instance, Fornero and Monticone (2011) and
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a)), and we rely on simple questions that have the characteristics pointed
out by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011c), i.e., simplicity, relevance, brevity and capacity to differentiate.
We show our indicator to capture one latent construct, which is labelled financial literacy.
The strategy used in this paper hinges on two main assumptions: the absence of self-selection of,
respectively, individuals as clients of a PattiChiari bank and banks into the PattiChiari Consortium.
We extensively discuss them in the paper. Results are robust to a number of falsification checks
regarding potential sorting of customers or banks. Moreover, first-stage statistics show that the
instrumental variable we use is not weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the related literature, mainly focusing
on empirical contributions (Section 2). We then describe the main features of the PattiChiari
Consortium and services provided by banks in the Consortium to their clients, highlighting the
channels through which these services may foster financial literacy (Section 3). We present the data
used to perform our analysis in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates our empirical approach and discusses
the hypothesis at the core of the identification strategy. We present our main findings in Section 6,
and we analyse the channels driving the estimated effects and their heterogeneity along household
characteristics in Section 7. In Section 8, we provide evidence that estimated effects are not driven
by self-selection of clients into PattiChiari banks, while in Section 9, we show that selection of
banks into the Consortium does not explain our results either. For the sake of brevity, we report
additional robustness checks only in an online Appendix. Section 10 discusses policy implications
and concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the literature that analyses interventions aimed at fostering financial literacy. In
two recent reviews, Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and Hastings et al. (2013) point out the shortage of
rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of financial education programmes. Selective participation
into programmes, non-random attrition and measurement issues related to financial literacy and
financial behaviour undermine identification of causal effect of financial literacy programmes.
Recent papers that tackle these issues provide mixed results about the impact of financial edu-
cation programmes on financial knowledge and behaviours. The meta-analysis in Fernandes et al.
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(2014) documents a weak effect of interventions on the improvement of financial literacy. On the
contrary, Luehrmann et al. (2015) and Bruhn et al. (2013) show high school education programmes
to affect both financial literacy and saving behaviour. In a different context, Gibson and Zia (2012)
study how financial literacy training turns out to increase financial knowledge and information-
seeking behaviour of migrants, reducing the use of more expensive remittance products. Cole et al.
(2011) find financial education to increase financial literacy in developing countries (India and In-
donesia), with small and heterogeneous effects on economic behaviour (namely the probability of
opening a bank account). Similarly, information on social security benefits in the US improve work-
ers’ knowledge without significantly affecting their financial decisions (Mastrobuoni, 2011). With
respect to these studies, we show that bank information policies shape both financial literacy and
financial assets, albeit, they are effective on a small subsample of the population.
From a different perspective, literature in economics and behavioural finance suggests that the
difficulty of processing complex information may hamper financial decision making and that the
latter can be improved by providing decision makers with better quality information (Altman, 2012;
Garcia, 2013). According to OECD guidelines (OECD, 2013a), effective financial education pro-
grams should: (i) offer material in formats and locations that are easy to access; (ii) help consumers
to simplify financial decisions, for instance, breaking them into intermediate steps or providing
rules-of-thumb or problem-solving strategies; (iii) increase saliency by providing participants with
regular reminders or tools to track and visualize individual progress. The bank information policies
we consider in the paper are in line with these suggestions.
Our paper also relates to the literature that investigates the causal effect of financial literacy
on financial outcomes. Jappelli and Padula (2013b) and Lusardi et al. (2011) provide a theoretical
framework to analyse the investment in financial literacy and its impact on wealth in the context of
inter-temporal utility maximization. These models highlight that financial literacy and wealth are
simultaneously determined and that the incentives to invest in financial literacy may depend on the
level of wealth, raising the potential endogeneity issue of financial literacy in the wealth equation.2
Recent papers tackle this endogeneity problem, pursuing instrumental variable strategies for iden-
tification. Finding an exogenous source of variability in this setting is difficult and most of the
identification strategies adopted in observational studies so far are not free from criticism (see
2Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) show that the instrumental variable estimate of the impact of wealth on financial
literacy is not statistically significant. They interpret this finding to support the absence of reverse causality in their
data.
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Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014, for a detailed discussion of the instruments proposed in the literature).
These papers can be grouped into three broad categories. A first group of papers exploits as instru-
ments pre-labour market endowment of financial knowledge (Disney and Gathergood, 2011; Jappelli
and Padula, 2013b; van Rooij et al., 2012). However, van Rooij et al. (2012) are skeptical about the
validity of the exclusion restriction for the instrumental variable they use, and they discuss the issue
at length in the paper, adding a rich set of controls to their baseline specification. Other studies
hinge on the idea that the respondent’s financial literacy is influenced by financial knowledge of
peers or reference groups (Alessie et al., 2011; Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011; Fornero and Mon-
ticone, 2011; Jappelli and Padula, 2013a; Klapper et al., 2013; Klapper and Panos, 2011; van Rooij
et al., 2012). The assumption that lies behind this identification strategy is that the respondent
cannot influence the peers’ experience significantly, i.e., there is no “reflection problem” (Manski,
1993). An alternative instrumental variable strategy is proposed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b).
They take advantage of the fact that several US states mandated high school financial education
in the past and exploit the exogenous variation in financial literacy induced by the exposure to the
mandate to identify the effect of financial literacy.
Our paper does not belong to any of these categories and proposes a new strategy to identify the
causal effect of financial literacy on household wealth that exploits, for the first time, the role of
bank information policies in fostering household financial knowledge. Starting from the assumption
that acquiring financial knowledge is a costly process (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b), we argue that
bank information policies, undertaken by a specific subset of Italian banks, may decrease the cost of
acquiring financial literacy without imposing additional burden to the client in terms of time, effort
or resources. We exploit this exogenous source of variation in the cost of acquiring financial knowl-
edge to investigate the effect of financial literacy on financial assets. As pointed out by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2014), most studies find that the OLS estimate of the impact of financial literacy is
biased downward, but the estimates differ a lot across papers, and the magnitude of the bias varies
largely in the literature. The instrumental variable estimates range from three times larger than
the corresponding OLS estimates (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b; van Rooij et al., 2012) to thirteen
times larger than OLS (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011). Our findings confirm the downward
bias of the OLS estimate, showing that the causal effect is four times larger.
Financial literacy affects financial assets through different channels (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2007a). Whatever is the most relevant channel, all point towards financial literacy being positively
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correlated with financial assets. First, it shapes portfolio management by improving the under-
standing of the risk associated with different assets, fostering stock market participation (Christelis
et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 2011, 2012) and increasing returns yielded by a specific financial
product (as shown by Deuflhard et al., 2015, for saving accounts). Moreover, financial literacy may
reduce underestimation of compounding effects (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b). Finally, as a result of
increased financial knowledge, individuals may make more-accurate or less-biased predictions and
improve their understanding of pension and tax schemes, thus reflecting a better ability to make
optimal choices.3
Guiso and Viviano (2015) investigate whether financial literacy affects the quality of choices,
namely the ability to dismiss a dominated alternative. Financial knowledge turns out to increase
the ability to avoid financial mistakes and to make autonomous decisions about portfolio manage-
ment, albeit, the estimated effect is small. Even though we lack adequate data to make a similar
assessment, evidence that literate individuals hold more diversified portfolios is consistent with
better portfolio management. Our evidence is, however, only suggestive.
3 The PattiChiari Consortium
The PattiChiari Consortium was created in 2003 by a group of banks, with the support of the
Italian Banking Association (Associazione Bancaria Italiana: ABI, henceforth). By 2010, 98 banks
were members of it, corresponding to around 64% of all bank branches in the Italian territory.
All except one of the 70 banks we consider in the paper (see Section 9 for more details) joined
the consortium in 2003; one (Cassa di risparmio della provincia di Chieti) joined in 2004. In
some regions (Trentino-Alto Adige and Calabria) there are few PattiChiari branches, while in other
regions (Piedmont and Sardinia) more than 80% of branches belong to a PattiChiari bank. The
share of PattiChiari branches is, however, homogeneous across broader geographical areas: about
63% in northern Italy, 67% in central Italy and 64% in southern Italy.
The Consortium develops actions aimed at fostering bank transparency and improving financial
literacy among citizens.4 A bank that joins the Consortium has to introduce a set of “Quality
3A better ability to understand current (less-generous, defined contribution) pension rules and to anticipate
a reduction in the value of social security wealth may increase savings necessary to sustain an adequate level of
consumption during retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a).
4It has implemented a set of formal financial literacy programmes in Italian schools and, starting from 2012, in
workplaces and cultural and charitable associations.
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Commitments” (so called “Impegni per la qualita`”). They are aimed at improving transparency
in the relation between bank and clients and, thus, do not have any goal of advertising specific
financial products or promoting any specific behaviour, economic choice or investment in any asset.
In the period we analyse (year 2010), these commitments refer to information about mortgage and
debt and to comparability of current accounts. In what follows, we present these two commitments
in detail.
Information about mortgage and debt. Every month PattiChiari banks send by mail a mort-
gage statement to their clients. This statement includes information on total and residual amounts
of debt, interest rates, the residual number of instalments and reminder information about penalties.
In addition, a 24-page booklet is available in each PattiChiari branch. The booklet covers several
topics related to mortgages and provides definitions of more-general economic concepts.5 It includes
examples about the calculation of interest rates and instalments and provides several remarks.6 An
example of its content is the following remark (our translation from Italian): “WARNING: With
a lower mortgage payment the duration of the mortgage increases. Therefore, the total amount of
interest paid on the mortgage will be higher, because the number of instalments increases”.
Comparability of current accounts. Costs, interest rates and general contract conditions of
bank accounts vary both across and within banks. For instance, one bank may offer up to 12
different bank accounts tailored to a specific type of customer (e.g., household, retired, younger
than 18). The PattiChiari Consortium provides a search engine that allows the direct comparison
of specific characteristics of bank accounts across different banks, as well as the information on the
location of bank branches. Thanks to the provision of detailed information on interest rates, we
expect households to become more aware about how current accounts work and more accustomed
to concepts like interest rate compounding.
The “Quality Commitments” described above are in line with the OECD suggestions to improve
the effectiveness of education programmes (OECD, 2013b). Indeed, they provide informative ma-
5More specifically, it refers to mortgage portability, substitution or renegotiation, mortgage resolution and redemp-
tion. It gives a definition for amortization plan, mortgage resolution, Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), IRS
(Interest Rate Swap), Eurirs (Euro Interest Rate Swap), fixed-rate, adjustable-rate and mixed-rate mortgages, TAEG
(synthetic indicator of the cost of the mortgage), portability, instalment, spread, renegotiation and subrogation.
6A copy of the booklet, available in Italian only, can be downloaded from the URL
https://web.archive.org/web/20111030200724/http://www.pattichiari.it/dotAsset/12557.pdf
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terial on a regular basis (costumers receive the mortgage statement every month) in format and
locations that are easy to access (mail, bank branch and websites). These interventions are de-
signed to simplify costumers’ decision problems, providing definitions and synthesis of basic and
simple information about relevant economic concepts, such as amortization plans and interest-rate
compounding, sometimes through examples. These concepts are closely related to the standard
questions used to measure financial literacy in the literature and in our paper (see Appendix A
in the online Appendix for the exact wording of the questions used to measure financial literacy).
“Quality Commitments” are not directly related to the provision of formal financial advice and do
not typically take this form. However, they can indirectly impact the probability of consulting an
advisor and delegating the portfolio-choice management if it depends on financial literacy (Calcagno
and Monticone, 2015).
Why Do Banks Join the PattiChiari Consortium? Application to the PattiChiari Con-
sortium is decided at the bank level, and it involves all the branches in the Italian territory. Any
bank can apply to be a member of the Consortium, provided that it undertakes the “Quality Com-
mitments”. The PattiChiari board of directors evaluates applications. If a member bank does not
meet the requirements, it can be fined and excluded from the Consortium.7 The Consortium, based
in Rome at the ABI’s headquarters, develops projects that are implemented by each PattiChiari
bank.
There is no fee for entering the Consortium, yet the bank has to incur administrative costs in
order to comply with the “Quality Commitments”. Menu costs make the commitment regarding the
comparability between current accounts the most demanding task for member banks. In particular,
significant menu costs have to be incurred in order to adjust the offer of bank accounts to the stan-
dards (allowing their comparability across banks). High entry costs may partly explain the large
share of PattiChiari partners among large banks (see Section 9). Concerning the advantages of
entering the PattiChiari Consortium, banks improve the quality of supplied services and customer
satisfaction and, in turn, benefit from advertising provided by the Consortium.8 Descriptive statis-
7After considering all mergers and acquisitions among banks over the relevant period, we find that only 1.5% of
households in our baseline sample remained with a bank that changed affiliation with the PattiChiari Consortium.
In all these cases, these banks exited the Consortium after belonging to it for a period between 6 months and 5 years.
8Informative advertising can benefit both the firm that makes the investment (in our application a bank belonging
to the PattiChiari Consortium) and its competitors, through an increase in savings, stock market participation and
the demand for financial services in general (Hastings et al., 2013). Free-riding problems may induce under-provision
of informative advertising. In our case, however, the fact that over 60% of all bank branches belong to the Consortium,
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tics of bank characteristics, and their heterogeneity between PattiChiari banks and non-PattiChiari
banks are discussed in Section 9.
4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), a biannual survey that collects detailed information on household income, savings and
portfolios from a nationally representative sample of Italian households.
Households’ financial assets are defined as the sum of deposits, securities and commercial credits
at the end of the reference year (2010 for the baseline analysis).9 Several covariates (age, gender,
education) refer to the household head, defined as the household member who is responsible for
economic and financial decision. We observe financial literacy of the household head only. Our
baseline empirical analysis is based on the 2010 wave, because it includes both questions about
the reasons for choosing the bank (available only in this year) and questions to measure financial
literacy. In Section B.3 of the online Appendix (table B.4), we check the validity of the results in
a larger sample that also includes 2006 and 2008 waves: results are fully consistent.
The set of questions on financial literacy is included since 2006 varies slightly across waves. In
the 2010 wave, respondents are asked three questions related to portfolio diversification, the risk
associated to fixed or adjustable interest rate and the effect of inflation.10 Questions about diversi-
fication and inflation are similar to the ones devised for the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS
henceforth) (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011a), while knowledge of mortgage-repayment mechanisms is
not considered in the HRS. All these questions follow the principles of simplicity, relevance, brevity
and capacity to differentiate identified by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011c). Table 1 shows that in 2010
almost three out of four respondents answered correctly to the question on inflation; the percentage
of correct answers to the question on mortgages and portfolio diversification is, respectively, 64%
and 55%. On average, respondents answered correctly to fewer than two questions, and one respon-
according to ABI data, should mitigate the incentive to free-ride.
9More precisely, assets include, along with bank accounts, Italian government securities, bonds and Italian invest-
ment funds, Italian shares and equities, managed portfolios, foreign securities and a residual category. Commercial
credits include (i) credits of the household’s members with relatives or friends not living with the household and (ii)
trade credits to costumers of respondents who are self-employed, members of a profession, individual entrepreneurs
or employed in a family business.
10See Section A in the online Appendix for the exact wording of the questions and details on differences across
waves.
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dent out of three correctly answered all questions. We measure financial literacy with the number
of questions correctly answered by the household head. We present evidence corroborating the as-
sumption that our indicators measure just one latent construct, that we name financial literacy (as
in van Rooij et al., 2011). In Section A in the online Appendix, we show that our baseline results
are confirmed when we measure financial literacy with this latent construct instead of measuring it
as the number of correct answers out of three questions as we do in the baseline regression in the
paper. Moreover, our results are robust to the use of different measures of financial literacy (see
Section 6).
We use information on the date of entrance and exit of each Italian banking group in the Pat-
tiChiari Consortium and the answers to questions about the banks used by the household to build
an indicator of whether the household is a client of a bank that is part of the PattiChiari Consor-
tium. Our baseline analysis focuses on households having at least one bank account. Households in
the SHIW dataset report their “main”bank - as defined by the household head - and up to seven ad-
ditional banks where they hold a current account. Answers can be chosen from a list of 87 financial
institutions (encompassing more than 85% of total credit granted in Italy). If the bank is not listed
among the possible answers, its name will be missing. For each household, we construct a dummy
(Patti) that is equal to 1 if the main bank used by the respondent belongs to the Consortium at the
beginning of 2010 and 0 if it does not; we exclude households who do not have any bank accounts
or for which the name of the bank is missing. Descriptive statistics show 73% of respondents in our
sample to be clients of a bank belonging to the PattiChiari Consortium (Table 1).
We include in the sample households whose head is aged 30 or above, because we want to exclude
cases in which individuals may be still enrolled in full-time education (at the university) and thus
not financially independent from the family of origin. After excluding from our sample outliers
and respondents who do not report the reason for choosing the bank, the final sample size in our
baseline regression (2010 wave data) is 4,865 observations (descriptive statistics are shown in Table
1).11 For some complementary analysis, we merge this data with data from the 2002 SHIW wave:
due to the rotating panel of the survey, only 1,027 households were interviewed in 2002 and 2010.
Notably, no measure of financial literacy is available in the 2002 SHIW wave.
We collect information on bank branches active in Italy in 2010 from the SIOTEC database.
11We exclude the upper and lower 5% tail of the financial-assets distribution. Results are similar with 1% trimming.
There are tied values, and we discuss this point in more detail in Section B.5 in the online Appendix.
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This database, administered by the Bank of Italy, is based on compulsory information provided
by each branch to the Supervisory Agency. The only financial institution excluded by SIOTEC
is BancoPosta (the financial arm of the Italian post office), for which we obtained the number of
branches from the notes to its 2010 balance-sheet.12
We use data from a nationally representative sample of bank accounts (the Survey on Bank Fees
and Expenditures, SBFE hereafter) to check that the fees and costs charged by PattiChiari and
non-PattiChiari banks are on average similar. This dataset, administered by the Bank of Italy’s
Banking and Financial Supervision Area, is currently the most comprehensive source of information
on bank costs in Italy, and it collects information on fixed bank-account costs, debit/credit card
fees, costs of bank transfers and withdrawals. We use the 2010 wave, and we rely on data on 6,717
current accounts surveyed in SBFE and belonging to banks present in the SHIW dataset. Note
that the SBFE samples household’s bank accounts rather than banks, bank branches or customers.
This is a sensible choice, because each bank may offer several types of accounts, with different costs.
The data at hand suggest that SBFE might oversample accounts of PattiChiari banks.
5 Empirical Strategy
We examine the effect of financial literacy on financial assets by considering the model:
wip = β0 + β1flip +Xipβ2 + γp + εip. (1)
where flip is financial literacy of the head of household i living in province p in 2010; wip is house-
hold’s financial assets in 2010; Xip is a vector of individual-level observable characteristics.
13 γp is
a province fixed-effect (province effects are denoted by δp or µp in equations (2) and (3), respec-
tively). The parameter of interest is β1, which captures the effect of financial literacy on financial
assets. OLS estimates of β1 in equation (1) may be biased because of: (i) individual unobserved
12We were able to retrieve information on total assets in 2010 for 70 out of the 87 bank names presented in the
questionnaire from the Supervisory Register of the Bank of Italy. For the remaining 17 banks, it was not possible to
recover such information because of different reasons. In 14 cases, banks included in the questionnaire did not have
an autonomous balance-sheet: e.g., Unicredit Banca and Unicredit Private Banking share the same balance-sheet
data in our data sources; the Banca Popolare di Intra was part of VenetoBanca. Finally, for 3 banks, neither the
Supervisory Register nor other sources, such as Bankscope, reported any information for year 2010.
13In the baseline specification, controls include gender of the household head, a second-order polynomial in age,
years of education of the household head, household current-labour income, household size, marital status and size
of the municipality (3 categories: 20,000-40,000; 40,000-500,000; more than 500,000 inhabitants).
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heterogeneity (i.e., ability, patience or preferences) correlated with both financial literacy and the
value of financial assets; (ii) reverse causality; (iii) measurement error. In the first case, the sign
of the bias is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the sign of the correlation between flip and
εip in equation (1). The theoretical arguments in Jappelli and Padula (2013b) suggest that reverse
causality should lead to an upward bias in the estimate of β1, since individual wealth may affect
the incentive to increase financial education, both through a change in the opportunity-cost of time
and through a change in the relative benefit from knowing how financial tools work.14 Finally, mea-
surement error in financial literacy may be substantial, because respondents may guess the answer
at random, or they may misunderstand the question.15 In these cases, OLS estimate may be biased
downward (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b). Overall, these remarks suggest that: (i) OLS estimates
may be biased, and (ii) the sign of the bias cannot be assessed theoretically, since it depends on the
relevance of each of the channels described above.
To address the endogeneity issue, we pursue an instrumental variable approach, using the indica-
tor for being a client of a PattiChiari bank as an instrument for financial literacy.16 More precisely,
the following linear model represents the first-stage equation for financial literacy in equation (1):
flip = α0 + α1Pattiip +Xipα2 + δp + νip (2)
where Pattiip is a dummy equal to 1 if the household is a client of a bank belonging to the
PattiChiari Consortium. The estimate of the α1 coefficient captures the impact of information
policies implemented by the PattiChiari Consortium on customers financial literacy.
Similarly, to estimate the effect of bank information policies on financial assets, we consider the
equation:
wip = θ0 + θ1Pattiip +Xipθ2 + µp + ξip (3)
14Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a), however, present empirical results that suggest that reverse causality is not a
relevant issue in American data (HRS).
15Evidence from the U.S. (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009) and the Netherlands (van Rooij et al., 2011) suggests that
survey data on this issue are sensitive to how the question is worded.
16In principle, we might rely on the panel component of our dataset and include household fixed effects in equation
(1). There are three arguments against this choice. First, financial assets and financial literacy are both highly
stable over the short time span we consider (2006-2010) in this application. Second, respondents may learn, or at
least receive a stimulus to acquire knowledge, from previous interviews: the variation in correct answers may capture
a retest effect rather than increases in financial literacy. This would affect estimates delivered by a fixed-effect
identification approach, while it does not drive our results, as we show in the online Appendix, Section B. Third,
using the longitudinal panel would cut sample size by half because of attrition and survey design. Furthermore,
in case of reverse causality or measurement error, coefficients in equation (1) are biased, also when including fixed
effects.
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where the parameter θ1 captures the effect of being a client of a bank in the PattiChiari Consortium
on financial assets. We expect α1 and θ1 to be statistically significant and positive, and we argue that
the variable Pattiip is exogenous in both equations. Provided that Pattiip is exogenous in equation
(2) and (3), OLS estimates of these parameters are consistent and have a causal interpretation.
Instrumental variable estimate of coefficient β1 in equation (1) measures the causal effect of financial
literacy on assets, since it rests on consistent estimation of α1 and θ1 with OLS and an exclusion
restriction (Angrist et al., 1996).
Let us discuss the rationale behind our identification strategy. Investing in financial literacy is
costly for individuals, and the investment decision is made comparing marginal cost and marginal
benefit (Jappelli and Padula, 2013b), where the latter may depend on financial wealth w and indi-
viduals’ characteristics X. We argue that the “Quality Commitments” undertaken by a PattiChiari
bank lower the cost of acquiring financial education without directly affecting the benefits related
to additional financial literacy. Thus, other things being equal, we expect PattiChiari clients to
accumulate more financial literacy and end up with a higher stock of it. For this interpretation
to be valid, the following three assumptions must be fulfilled. First, net of information policies,
banks belonging to the PattiChiari Consortium, may not differ from other banks with respect to
characteristics that may directly affect household financial assets (such as costs and fees charged,
credit rationing, mortgage policies, etc.). Second, individuals must not self-select as clients of a
specific bank according to its information policy. In other words, the choice of the bank must
not depend on variables that, conditional on province (or municipality) of residence, directly affect
financial literacy or wealth. Third, banks must not join the Consortium in order to attract clients
that are wealthier or more financially literate. All these assumptions should hold within province
in a given year, because all our regressions include province fixed effects. These three assumptions
are partly testable on the basis of the data at hand and deserve a careful discussion. We discuss
client selection in Section 8, while we focus on differences in observable characteristics of banks in
Section 9. The evidence presented supports the validity of the assumptions above and, thus, the
causal interpretation of our estimates.
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6 Findings
Table 2 shows estimate results of the baseline specification, which includes, along with household
covariates and province fixed effects, controls for motivations for choosing the bank.17 The as-
sociation between financial literacy and financial assets is positive (column OLS). One standard
deviation increase in financial literacy (i.e., one more correct answer) is associated with an increase
in financial assets by more than 2,000 euros (approximately 11% of the average financial-assets
holdings in our baseline sample). As discussed in Section 5, this estimate is unlikely to reflect a
causal relationship but represents an important benchmark for our analysis.
Moving to the first-stage results (column FS in Table 2), being a client of a PattiChiari bank
leads an individual to give 0.24 additional correct answers, which is approximately one-fourth of a
standard deviation of financial literacy, about 12% of the average number of correct answers given
in the sample. The effect of bank information policies on financial literacy is sizeable compared to
other explanatory variables in our regressions: the impact of being a client of a bank that belongs
to the PattiChiari Consortium is comparable to the effect of increasing education by five years.18
The F-test on excluded instruments is about 44, showing that, when we interpret this equation as
the first stage of our IV strategy, the instrument is not weak.19
The instrumental variable estimates we present in the paper apply to the sub-population of
compliers (Angrist et al., 1996), namely, individuals whose financial knowledge increases because
of information policies carried out by banks. When both the instrumental variable (indicator for
being a PattiChiari client) and the treatment variable (measure for financial literacy) are binary,
the proportion of compliers can be estimated and corresponds to the first-stage estimate of the
effect of the instrument on the endogenous regressor (Angrist et al., 1996). In Table 3, we consider
four alternative measures for financial literacy, and we estimate the effect of being a PattiChiari
17Unless otherwise stated, estimated standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
at the province level, the largest level at which we have enough clusters (103) to obtain consistent estimates of the
second moment of the estimator distribution.
18As discussed in Section 2, evidence on the causal impact of interventions on financial literacy is still limited.
Assessing the effect of bank information policies relative to other interventions is, therefore, not straightforward.
Klapper and Panos (2011) consider the role of newspapers in Russia and find that a 1% increase in their number
raises average financial literacy in the population by nearly 4%. Comparatively, increasing the number of universities
by 1% would increase financial literacy by 0.15%. Carpena et al. (2011) assess the effect of a video-based financial
literacy programme in India, finding it increases financial awareness by about 8%. The relative size of the effect we
find seems, thus, slightly larger than the one of previous information/training instruments in Russia and India. More
recently, Luehrmann et al. (2015) studies the effect of a financial education programme for teenagers in Germany,
finding it both significantly increases their financial knowledge and reduces their propensity to buy on impulse.
19Staiger and Stock (1997) indicate a rule of thumb suggesting that the F-statistic should be greater than 10 to
rule out weak identification problems.
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client on each of these binary indicators: these are also alternative estimates of the proportion of
compliers in the population. We report the baseline result in the bottom panel. The first alternative
indicator is a dummy equal to 1 if all three questions have been answered correctly; we then consider
three indicators capturing correct answers to each question, separately. Being a PattiChiari client
is strongly correlated with all these indicators, leading to an increase that ranges between 11% and
14% of the average financial literacy (see Table 1), depending on the definition. These estimated
coefficients suggest that the compliers represent a small fraction of our sample, ranging between
5% and 10% of the population.
Financial assets of households that have the main current account in a PattiChiari bank are
1,900 euros higher than clients of other banks, roughly 10% of the average value of assets in our
sample (column ITT in Table 2). The resulting instrumental variable estimate of the causal effect of
financial literacy on financial assets (column IV of Table 2) is larger than suggested by OLS estima-
tion. On average, a one-standard deviation increase in financial literacy (i.e., an additional correct
answer provided, about a 50% increase with respect to the average financial literacy), conditional
on other covariates, increases household assets by 8,000 euros, approximately 35% of a standard
deviation in financial assets. Thus, in line with findings by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b), the causal
effect of financial literacy is around four times higher than suggested by the corresponding correla-
tion. This effect, however, applies to the sub-population of individuals whose knowledge of financial
instruments increases because of the information policies of the PattiChiari banks and cannot be
generalized to the average sample household without further assumptions (Angrist, 2004).
The downward bias in the OLS estimate can be explained by a negative correlation between finan-
cial literacy and the error term in the financial assets equation and by the presence of substantial
measurement error in financial literacy. First, individual, specific unobservables may be negatively
correlated with financial literacy and positively associated with financial assets (or vice versa). For
instance, wealthy individuals may have a higher opportunity cost of time and/or expect a greater re-
turn, in absolute terms, yielded by professional portfolio management. They may, therefore, reduce
their investment in financial literacy and delegate portfolio-management decisions to a professional
advisor, who is able to generate larger returns. This would lead to a downward bias in the OLS es-
timate. Second, the indicator(s) for financial literacy may suffer from measurement error, since the
respondent may misunderstand the survey questions or pick the answer randomly. This argument
is consistent with evidence on the sensitivity of answers to financial literacy questions, documented
16
by Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) for the US and by van Rooij et al. (2011) for the Netherlands.
We check the robustness of our findings to several falsification checks, which are reported and
discussed in Section B in the online Appendix. In particular, we explore: (i) the role of retest effects
and the timing of the effect of bank information policies and financial literacy; (ii) the role of trust
in institutions; (iii) the sensitivity of our results to sample selection and the functional form. Our
results turn out to be robust to all these checks.
We consider alternative measures of being a PattiChiari client, based on all the current accounts
held, and measure whether the household is a client of at least one PattiChiari bank. Estimate
results, reported in the online Appendix (Table C-1), show that our findings are robust to the use of
these alternative indicators. Results turn out to be robust also to the inclusion of municipality-fixed
effects (see Table C-2 in the online Appendix).
7 Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
Financial literacy can affect wealth through many different channels.20 With the data at hand,
we can analyse three potentially relevant mechanisms that may drive the positive effect measured
in the aggregate. First, we investigate to what extent portfolio composition depends on financial
literacy of the respondent (Christelis et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 2011, 2012). Second, we examine
whether literate respondents are more prone to plan for retirement (Alessie et al., 2011; Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2008), which, in turn, may enhance saving. Finally, we focus on the relation between
financial literacy and saving behaviour.
Looking at portfolio composition, we exploit information about assets held by SHIW respon-
dents, and we examine to what extent the probability of holding equities, mutual funds and govern-
ment bonds differs, according to financial literacy. We also consider a binary indicator of household
participation to the stock market, either directly or through a mutual fund. To analyse the role of
retirement planning, we use answers to the following question (not asked to retirees): “Have you
ever thought about how to arrange for your household’s support when you retire?” Saving rate is
defined as the ratio between savings and income.
20We refer to Jappelli and Padula (2013b) (note 5) and Lusardi et al. (2011) for a discussion of the links between
financial literacy and financial wealth. Relevant channels relate to expectations (literate individuals may be more
accurate and/or less biased), preferences (financial literacy may ease the understanding of risk and reducing ‘direct
risk aversion’), perceptions (financial literacy may reduce underestimation of compounding effects), diversification
and the cost charged on loans or mutual funds.
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Results reported in Table 4 suggest that financial literacy leads to an increase in stock market
participation and to a more diversified portfolio. While lack of availability of more detailed data on
portfolio management prevents us to examine the effect of financial literacy on the quality of finan-
cial decisions, as in Guiso and Viviano (2015), our results are consistent with financial literacy to
promote a better portfolio management, in terms of diversification and stock market participation.
Financially literate respondents holding a more-efficient and diversified portfolio may contribute to
explain the positive effect of financial knowledge on financial assets. This channel may be partic-
ularly relevant in Italy, a country characterized by relatively low participation rates in the stock
market (Bottazzi et al., 2013).
Turning to planning for retirement and saving rate, while the estimated coefficient is positive, we
fail to detect a significant causal effect of financial literacy on both outcomes. This finding may
reflect the fact that Italy is characterized by a generous pension system, compared to other coun-
tries, and relatively high saving rates. Undersaving to meet retirement target in Italy might thus
be a less-relevant issue with respect to other countries.
To shed more light on the heterogeneity of the impact of bank information policies and on the
effect of financial literacy on financial assets, we estimate our baseline model across age and educa-
tion groups. The results are shown in Table 5. The first and the second panels report estimates for,
respectively, low- and high-educated respondents; the third and fourth panels consider, respectively,
the young and the elderly, and the bottom panel refers to the subgroup of low-educated individ-
uals aged 60+. The effect of financial literacy on financial assets is the largest for low-educated
and old respondents (the IV coefficient is 12.6 in the bottom panel). This finding is consistent
with returns of financial literacy that are decreasing in education.21 In addition, individuals aged
60+ are expected to be wealthier than the young and, in turn, to gain more from their financial
knowledge. The bias in the OLS estimate is the highest when 60+ and low-educated respondents
are considered. The determinants of the bias described above are, thus, more relevant in this sub-
sample. First, education is expected to be negatively correlated with the probability of choosing the
answer at random or not understanding the questions. Moreover, the elderly may be less focused
when answering the questionnaire and, thus, more subject to measurement error. Second, 60+
21This latter result is in line with the results by Cole et al. (2011), showing, in a different context, a significant
impact of financial literacy (on the demand for current accounts in India and Indonesia) only for those with limited
education or financial literacy.
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and low-educated households may be more likely to delegate their portfolio’s management rather
than investing in their financial knowledge, further increasing the bias in the OLS estimate of the
effect of financial literacy on assets. Turning to the effectiveness of bank information policies, they
significantly foster financial knowledge in all the subgroups we consider, but the magnitude of their
effect is substantially greater for low-educated respondents and for those aged 60+.
8 Evidence Against Self-Selection of Households into Pat-
tiChiari Banks
In this section, we discuss evidence supporting absence of self-selection of households into Pat-
tiChiari or non-PattiChiari banks, which lies behind the validity of our identification strategy.22
Why do households become customers of PattiChiari (or non-PattiChiari) banks?
We start by exploring the determinants of a household’s bank choices, collected in SHIW through the
following question: “Why did you choose [the bank you use more often] when you and your household
first began using it?” We group available alternatives into three categories: (1) convenience, i.e.,
convenience to home/work, respondent’s employer’s bank (or respondent’s business’s bank); (2)
financial/economic reasons, i.e., favourable interest rates, speed of transaction execution, range
of services, low fees for services, possibility of online banking; (3) bank type, i.e., it is a well-
known/important bank, staff courtesy. The main reason for choosing a bank turns out to be related
to convenience, which is the only determinant for 63% of PattiChiari clients and for 67% of other
respondents. Financial conditions are the only determinant for less than 15% of the respondents
in both groups. We interpret this evidence as follows: the preferred financial offerings may be
readily available, and consumers typically decide their bank, depending on the one that is more
conveniently located to them. In other words, the constraint on financial services is not binding,
and it is satisfied by the abundance of options; hence, individuals choose on the basis of their second
(binding) constraint, namely convenience. Reasons for choosing the bank are included in the set
of control variables in our baseline specification (Table 2), but results are confirmed when we omit
these controls (see Table C-3 in the online Appendix).
22It is worth emphasizing that all the results are net of province (or municipality) fixed effects: we are, thus,
exploiting only the within-province variability of the instrument for identification.
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Banks join the PattiChiari Consortium to advertise their commitment to transparency (see Sec-
tion 3). Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the effectiveness of advertisement
does not depend on financial literacy or wealth. While we cannot test this assumption directly, due
to lack of relevant data, we document that individuals do not self-select as a client of a specific
bank according to their wealth, as illustrated in the next paragraph.
Reverse causality: Are wealthier clients more likely to become PattiChiari clients?
In order to document absence of self-selection of clients according to their wealth, we exploit the
panel component of the SHIW dataset to retrieve information on household financial assets in 2002,
i.e., before the PattiChiari Consortium was created. First, we perform a “placebo” test, regressing
2002 assets on being a PattiChiari client in 2010. We fail to find a significant correlation between
being such a client in 2010 and 2002 assets.23 Second, in order to control for “pre-treatment”
differences in the asset endowment, we estimate the baseline specification by including financial
assets in 2002 among the control variables (see Table C-4 in the online Appendix). Results are
robust to the inclusion of this additional regressor.
Third, we control for the level of financial assets in 2002 and test whether assets of Patti-Chiari
and non-Patti-Chiari clients grew differently over the periods 2002-2006, 2002-2008 and 2002-2010.
Results are reported in Table 6, where we standardize growth rates to ease interpretation and
comparison of the different effects. The results are in line with the main findings in Table 2:
OLS underestimates the effect of financial literacy on growth of financial assets; the causal effect
of financial assets is positive and as large as about 15% of a standard deviation. Looking at
heterogeneity across years (Table C-5 in the online Appendix), the effect of financial literacy turns
out to be positive and significant in all years, and about 4% of a standard deviation smaller in 2008
(the year after the fall in stock market prices, documented by Bottazzi et al. (2013)), with respect
to 2006 and 2010.
We also explore whether there are differences in pre-treatment (2002) financial assets among
individuals who switch between PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks between 2006 and 2008 or
between 2008 and 2010 (details of this exercise are discussed in Section B.2 in the online Appendix).
We do not find any statistical difference in financial assets in 2002 between clients who remained
with PattiChiari banks, and those who cease to be clients of a PattiChiari or non-PattiChiari bank.
23The coefficient associated to the PattiChiari dummy in this test regression is 12.663 with a standard error of
13.847.
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We interpret this finding as evidence that there is no selection of clients into PattiChiari banks.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of variables that are possibly
correlated with both financial assets and financial literacy/PattiChiari indicator, namely the number
of bank accounts and homeownership. Estimate results illustrated in the online Appendix (bottom
panel of Table B.6 and Table C-6, respectively) further support the validity of our findings.
A matching estimator
We also estimate the effects of being a client of a PattiChiari bank on financial literacy and financial
assets using a matching estimator, based on propensity score matching, and we replicate the baseline
regression analysis of the paper on the sample where we observe clients of PattiChiari and non-
PattiChiari banks that have similar probability to be a PattiChiari client, based on observables.
We start estimating the propensity score through a logit model, where the dependent variable is the
probability of being a PattiChiari client in 2010.24 We perform radius matching with caliper 0.005,
with replacement, matching each treated individual with two controls: observations of PattiChiari
clients are used only once, while observations in the control group (non-PattiChiari clients) may be
used in several matches. A graphical representation of the common support is depicted in Figure C-1
in the online Appendix. Notably, most observations are on the common support (99.3%), and we are
not able to match only 0.007% of the households (36 out of 4,865) with a very high propensity score.
Table 7 reports results of instrumental variable regression on the common support. Specifications
based on Table 2 and the ones that achieve covariate balancing are shown in, respectively, the upper
and bottom panel. Our results turn out to be robust.
24The balancing property is satisfied after controlling for demographics of the household head (age, age squared,
gender, years of education, marital status) and household characteristics (number of household members, household
labour income), municipality population size (inhabitants), province fixed effects, reasons for choosing the main
bank and some interactions between those controls. More specifically, in addition to the levels of the listed variables,
we include interactions between: household head gender and marital status; household head marital status and
municipality size; family size and municipality size; household head gender and municipality size; household head
age and municipality size; family size and household labour income; household head marital status and household
labour income. See Table C-7 in the online Appendix.
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9 Evidence Against Self-Selection of Banks into the Pat-
tiChiari Consortium
In this Section, we present empirical evidence supporting the absence of self-selection of banks
into the PattiChiari Consortium. We start by analysing to which extent banks differ, according
to costs and credit policies. Table 8 illustrates costs of bank accounts charged by banks belonging
or not to the PattiChiari Consortium. Differences in costs and fees are generally not statistically
significant, the only exception being average debit card fees that are slightly larger (about 3 euros
per year) for non-PattiChiari banks. Our main results are unaffected by the inclusion of these costs
among the control variables (see the upper panel of Table C-8 in the online Appendix). To check
whether banks that belong to the PattiChiari Consortium differ from other banks with respect to
credit rationing, we exploit information about liquidity constraints provided by SHIW. We do not
find evidence of any correlation between being a PattiChiari client and being liquidity constrained,
which may signal differences in credit rationing, at standard significance levels.25
In principle, large and small banks may differ with respect to their policies about investment or
client relations, in their ability to attract clients and in other unobservables that may affect cus-
tomers’ wealth or financial literacy. Therefore, we examine to which extent banks belonging or not
to the PattiChiari Consortium are different according to their size. To this purpose, Table 9 ranks
banks according to their total assets and provides their number of branches and PattiChiari status:
49 out of the 70 banks listed (70%) belong to the PattiChiari Consortium (names of PattiChiari
banks are underlined). The following two columns in Table 9 report the decile of the empirical
distribution of total assets and of the number of branches to which each bank belongs. Among the
top-ten banks, both in terms of assets and in terms of number of branches, there are 9 PattiChiari
banks and 1 non-PattiChiari. Yet, apart from the top-sized banks, the rest of the distribution is
much more mixed. Within the sub-sample of small banks, PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks
are evenly distributed over both measures: among banks with below-median assets, there are 20
PattiChiari and 15 non-PattiChiari banks; among banks with below-median numbers of branches,
25Following Jappelli et al. (1998), we consider a household to be “liquidity constrained” if it either (a) applied
to a bank or a financial company to ask for loan or mortgages and the application was rejected, or (b) considered
the possibility to apply but did not, thinking that the application would have been rejected. At average values of
the covariates, the marginal effect of being a PattiChiari client on the probability of being liquidity constrained is
-0.005 with a standard error of 0.007. The model controls for province fixed effects, municipality size and individual
observable characteristics (quadratic polynomial in age, gender, marital status, household size, education, family
labour income and reason for choosing the main bank).
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there are 17 non-PattiChiari and 18 PattiChiari banks.26 We test for statistical differences in the
mean of these variables by PattiChiari status in Table C-9 in the online Appendix. The difference
is not statistically significant.
To check whether different characteristics between PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks drive
our results, we perform three different exercises. First, we examine the role of top-sized PattiChiari
banks. To explore this issue, we proceed by ordering all PattiChiari banks in terms of their size,
and by iteratively dropping an increasing number of banks, ranging from 1 to 20. Results are
stable and comparable to those in Table 2 (see Table C-10 and Table C-11 in the online Appendix).
Second, we consider a subsample of banks, where the overall size distribution for PattiChiari and
non-PattiChiari banks is similar and the share of PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks are evenly
distributed. Thus, we replicate our baseline results using data of clients of small or large banks
only (Table C-12 in the online Appendix). Finally, we test for the robustness of our results by
including assets and number of branches among the covariates (bottom panel of Table C-8 in the
online Appendix). To sum up, our core results seem not to be driven by the potential correlation
between bank size and PattiChiari status.
10 Concluding remarks
The interests by scholars and policymakers, in Europe and in the US, on the determinants of financial
literacy and on the link between financial literacy and wealth, has been constantly increasing in
the last years. Institutions, such as the OECD, the US Treasury Department and the European
Commission, have expressed the need for improved financial knowledge, emphasizing the role of
formal financial education in schools or at the workplace. However, whether these programmes
affect financial knowledge and financial decisions, and who are the reacting individuals are still
controversial issues. Most interventions are held at school or in the workplace and involve young
individuals.
In this paper, we posit the novel question: do bank information policies actually increase finan-
cial literacy and, in turn, household financial wealth? To answer this question, we identify a group
of Italian banks, the PattiChiari Consortium, which provide their customers with information about
simple economic concepts. We find that bank information policies are effective in improving finan-
26The Wilcoxon rank-sum test of assets and number of branches byPattiChiari status among small banks largely
fails to reject the null that the distributions are the same (p-values equal 0.79 and 0.82, respectively).
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cial literacy and influencing financial decisions for a small fraction of individuals in the population
and mostly so for the 60+ and low educated. These results should be interpreted in light of the
type of intervention that we study. The provision of simple and basic economic concepts is likely to
be more relevant for individuals who are less exposed to other sources of financial information, such
as economic newspapers or the web. When we consider compliance, the effectiveness of information
policies is limited (5-10% of the population). These policies are the most effective for consumers
who may profit more from them, suggesting positive selection on gains.
We use information policies as an instrument to identify the causal effect of financial literacy on
assets. On average, one standard deviation increase in financial literacy leads to an 8,000 euros
increase in financial assets. This effect is largely underestimated by simple correlations, which
suggest about a 2,000 euros increase. We show that the effect of financial literacy on financial
assets operates through changes in portfolio management and diversification, and it is driven by
a large impact on the small sub-sample of 60+ and low-educated respondents. While we cannot
assess whether financial knowledge is associated with an improvement in the quality of investment
decisions, increased portfolio diversification in our case-study may be possibly interpreted as in-
trinsically better, given Italy’s historically low rates of stock market participation. In a different
setting, where households already diversify portfolios, the improvement in the quality of financial
decisions related to an increase of financial knowledge may not lead to such large effects (see Guiso
and Viviano (2015)).
The impact on financial assets is remarkable, if compared with other studies of financial educa-
tion programmes that typically find small or no effects on financial decisions. Our estimate of this
effect, however, refers to the small subsample of the population whose financial literacy is affected
by information policies. The less educated and elderly are those who react more to the policy. Our
results are consistent with returns to financial education being decreasing in education, and older
households under-investing financial endowments accumulated over their lifetime. Two other fea-
tures of the intervention we consider may contribute to explaining the magnitude of the estimated
effect of financial literacy. First, individuals who receive information from banks are treated for a
rather long period of time (i.e., about 9 years, the average length of the relation between client and
bank), while financial education programs typically last for some months. Second, individuals re-
ceive financial education in a setting where this information is relevant. Indeed, it is mostly through
banks that households make their financial decisions, such as saving and diversifying their portfolio
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of investments. The magnitude of the bias of OLS estimates that we find is in line with previous
literature. This is partly due to heterogeneity in the effects of financial literacy on financial assets
and partly due to measurement error, suggesting that there is room to improve the way financial
literacy is measured.
Taken together, our analyses show that bank information policies are relevant in fostering fi-
nancial literacy of a small subsample of individuals who are, however, those who benefit more from
increased financial literacy. This points towards more-focused interventions. On the one hand, it
illustrates how financial education may be taught in different settings, which may be potentially
more salient than schools or workplaces. On the other hand, it indicates that targeting individuals
who respond more to information policies might be important to improve programme effectiveness
as well as the impact on individual wealth.27 We show that low-educated adults (specifically, those
aged 60+) are most responsive to bank information policies and benefit more from higher financial
literacy. Standard financial education programmes typically neglect adults, and this might be one
reason for the limited impact. Documenting whether this is the case and what drives participation
in these programmes might be an area for future research highly relevant for the design of future
interventions.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Financial literacy (number of correct answers out of three) 1.93 0.98 4865
Financial literacy, binary indicator 1(three out of three answers correct) 0.34 0.47 4865
Financial literacy, binary indicator 1(question on inflation correct) 0.74 0.44 4865
Financial literacy, binary indicator 1(question on loan correct) 0.64 0.48 4865
Financial literacy, binary indicator 1(question on portfolio diversification correct) 0.55 0.5 4865
Financial literacy (number of correct answers out of two present in 2006 & 2008) 1.38 0.71 4865
Instrumental variable, binary indicator 1(Household is PattiChiari client) (patti) 0.73 0.45 4865
Instrumental variable, binary indicator 1(Household is PattiChiari client) (patti atl) 0.75 0.43 4865
Financial assets (thousands) 19.4 22.4 4865
Savings rate+ 0.17 0.27 4865
Planning for retirement 0.46 0.50 2653
Ownership of equities and mutual funds 0.12 0.32 4865
Ownership of equities 0.06 0.23 4865
Ownership of mutual funds 0.08 0.27 4865
Ownership of government bonds 0.11 0.32 4865
Male household head 0.56 0.50 4865
Age 59 14.9 4865
Married 0.64 0.48 4865
Nb. hh components 2.47 1.21 4865
Years of education of the household head 9.81 4.46 4865
Household labor income 26.3 16.3 4865
Municipality 20.000-40.000 inh. 0.26 0.44 4865
Municipality 40.000-500.000 inh. 0.44 0.50 4865
Municipality 500.000+ inh. 0.10 0.30 4865
High trust∗ 0.56 0.50 4865
Length of relationship with the bank: less 2 years 0.04 0.18 4757
Length of relationship with the bank: 2-4 years 0.07 0.26 4757
Length of relationship with the bank: 5-10 years 0.16 0.37 4757
Length of relationship with the bank: more than 10 years 0.73 0.45 4757
Length of relationship with the bank∗∗: years 9.03 2.30 4757
Number of current accounts 1.2 0.46 4865
Homeownership 0.74 0.44 4865
Motivations for choosing the main bank∗∗∗
Only one reason: related to convenience 0.54 0.50 4865
Only one reason: related to financial/economic reason 0.07 0.25 4865
Only one reason: related to bank characteristics 0.02 0.15 4865
Two reasons: both related to convenience 0.12 0.32 4865
Two reasons: related to convenience & financial/economic reasons 0.10 0.30 4865
Two reasons: related to convenience & bank characteristics 0.10 0.31 4865
Two reasons: both related to financial/economic reasons 0.03 0.16 4865
Two reasons: financial/economic reasons & bank characteristics 0.02 0.15 4865
Two reasons: both related to bank characteristics 0.00 0.05 4865
Sources of information∗∗∗∗
Only intermediaries or experts 0.657 0.475 1492
Only press or websites 0.016 0.126 1492
Only friends, others, do not know 0.26 0.439 1492
Notes: Unless otherwise stated all descriptive statistics refer to the 2010 estimation sample.
+ Ratio between household savings and income, winsorized at 1%.
∗ Our measure of trust relies on the answer to the question “Do you trust your principal bank? Please assign a score of 1 to 10, where 1 means
’I don’t trust it at all’ and 10 means ’I trust it completely’ and the intermediate scores serve to graduate your response”. Respondents who
trust their main bank are those who choose a value above the median of the distribution of answers (8).
∗∗ Recoded from the categorical variable collected in the survey: for each category we impute the mid-point.
∗∗∗ Each respondent can give at most two answers to the question on why the main bank is chosen. The 13 alternatives among which
the respondent can choose are grouped into 3 broad categories: convenience (convenience to home/work, respondent’s employer’s bank (or
respondent’s business’s bank)), financial/economic reasons (favourable interest rates, speed of transaction execution, range of services, low fees
for services, possibility of online banking) and bank type (it is a well-known, important bank, staff courtesy). The figures show the percentage
of respondents who choose only one alternative, two alternatives in the same group or two alternatives in different categories.
∗∗∗∗ Based on the question about the information source consulted before the current investments were performed. Available only for households
who hold financial assets other than bank accounts. The figures show the average number of respondents who rely only on that specific source
of financial information.
Table 2: Baseline regressions.
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. assets Fin. lit. Fin. assets Fin. assets
Financial literacy 2.231*** 8.273***
(0.630) (2.979)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 1.941***
(0.035) (0.723)
Age 0.832*** 0.054*** 0.939*** 0.494**
(0.136) (0.006) (0.134) (0.197)
Age squared -0.005*** -0.000*** -0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 1.017 0.170*** 1.347** -0.063
(0.642) (0.025) (0.652) (0.705)
Married 2.479*** 0.024 2.497*** 2.295***
(0.625) (0.037) (0.645) (0.596)
Nb. hh components -1.501*** 0.051*** -1.391*** -1.812***
(0.292) (0.017) (0.292) (0.342)
Years education 0.918*** 0.045*** 0.999*** 0.626***
(0.095) (0.004) (0.091) (0.178)
Municipality 20.000-40.000 inhabitants 1.040 0.071 1.256 0.673
(1.415) (0.070) (1.456) (1.388)
Municipality 40.000-500.000 inhabitants 0.212 -0.009 0.157 0.235
(1.086) (0.088) (1.114) (1.173)
Municipality 500.000+ inhabitants -0.308 0.151 -0.027 -1.275
(2.061) (0.165) (2.024) (2.679)
Household labor income 0.414*** 0.000 0.413*** 0.409***
(0.033) (0.001) (0.034) (0.032)
Only one motivation: services 1.126 0.092 1.647 0.887
(1.207) (0.060) (1.204) (1.310)
Only one motivation: bank characteristics 1.804 -0.108 1.489 2.382
(1.870) (0.067) (1.847) (1.970)
Two motivations: two convenience 4.626*** 0.056 4.774*** 4.314***
(1.258) (0.052) (1.292) (1.165)
Two motivations: convenience & financial conditions 1.312 0.132* 1.786 0.698
(1.155) (0.069) (1.173) (1.208)
Two motivations: convenience & bank characteristics 4.595*** 0.067 4.665*** 4.113***
(1.306) (0.057) (1.303) (1.261)
Two motivations: two financial conditions 2.818 0.184** 3.470* 1.949
(1.741) (0.077) (1.832) (1.608)
Two motivations: financial conditions 1.644 0.139 2.013 0.862
& bank characteristics (2.232) (0.087) (2.242) (2.228)
Two motivations: two bank characteristics 4.698 0.037 4.701 4.391
(3.831) (0.172) (3.869) (3.844)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instruments 43.849
Notes: the table reports OLS, first-stage, intention-to-treat, and instrumental variable results of the model wip = α˜+ β˜flip +Xipγ˜ + λp + εip
where wip is financial assets owned by household i, living in province p, in year 2010; flip is financial literacy of the household head, Xip
is a vector of household controls (age, age squared, gender, marital status, years of education of the household head and number of household
components, household labour income in 2010) and λp is a province fixed effect. Financial literacy is instrumented with a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and 0 otherwise. Financial literacy is the number of correct
answers out of the three questions asked in 2010. 2010 SHIW Data. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in
parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3: Robustness: Different measures for financial literacy.
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. assets Fin. literacy Fin. assets Fin. assets
Number of answers correct out of 3
Financial literacy (nb/3) 2.231*** 8.273***
(0.630) (2.979)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 1.941***
(0.035) (0.723)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Binary indicator for 3 answers correct out of 3
Financial literacy (3 correct) 4.512*** 43.378**
(1.086) (20.156)
Client of PattiChiari 0.045*** 1.941***
(0.016) (0.723)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 8.152
Binary indicator for inflation question correct
Inflation correct 1.921 19.096***
(1.204) (7.315)
Client of PattiChiari 0.102*** 1.941***
(0.019) (0.723)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 29.128
Binary indicator for loan question correct
Loan correct 1.604** 27.207**
(0.798) (10.831)
Client of PattiChiari 0.071*** 1.941***
(0.013) (0.723)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 28.297
Binary indicator for portfolio question correct
Portfolio correct 5.287*** 31.491**
(1.136) (12.929)
Client of PattiChiari 0.062*** 1.941***
(0.019) (0.723)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 10.715
Notes: the table reports OLS, first-stage, intention-to-treat, and instrumental variable results of the model wip = α˜+ β˜flip +Xipγ˜ + λp + εip
where wip is financial assets owned by household i, living in province p, in year 2010; flip is financial literacy of the household head, Xip
is a vector of household controls (age, age squared, gender, marital status, years of education of the household head and number of household
components, household labour income in 2010) and λp is a province fixed effect. Financial literacy is instrumented with a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and 0 otherwise. 2010 SHIW Data. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4: Effect of Financial Literacy on Other Outcomes
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. assets Fin. literacy Fin. assets Fin. assets
Ownership of stock and funds
Financial literacy 0.019*** 0.134***
(0.006) (0.047)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 0.031***
(0.035) (0.010)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Ownership of equities
Financial literacy 0.006 0.026
(0.004) (0.028)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 0.006
(0.035) (0.007)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Ownership of mutual funds
Financial literacy 0.016*** 0.091*
(0.005) (0.047)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 0.021**
(0.035) (0.011)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Ownership of government bonds
Financial literacy 0.028*** 0.300***
(0.007) (0.070)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 0.070***
(0.035) (0.015)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Retirement Planning
Financial literacy 0.039*** 0.197
(0.014) (0.122)
Client of PattiChiari 0.213*** 0.042
(0.048) (0.026)
N. of observations 2653 2653 2653 2653
F-test on the excluded instr. 19.967
Saving rate
Financial literacy 0.002 0.023
(0.007) (0.043)
Client of PattiChiari 0.235*** 0.005
(0.035) (0.010)
N. of observations 4865 4865 4865 4865
F-test on the excluded instr. 43.849
Notes: The table reports OLS, first-stage, intention-to-treat, and instrumental variable results of the model DVip = α˜ + β˜flip + Xipγ˜ + λp +
εipwhere DVip is a dependent variable measured for household i, living in province p, in year 2010; flip is financial literacy of the household
head, Xip is a vector of household controls (as in the baseline specification of Table 2), and λp is a province fixed effect. Financial literacy is
instrumented with a dummy taking the value 1 if the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and 0 otherwise. Financial
literacy is the number of correct answers out of the three questions asked in 2010. 2010 SHIW Data. In the top four panels the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household owns equities, mutual funds or government bonds; in the fifth panel is a dummy equal to 1 if
the household head reports to have planned for retirement; in the bottom panel is the saving rate (ratio between savings and income, winsorized
at 1%). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 5: Heterogeneity in the Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets.
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. assets Fin. literacy Fin. assets Fin. assets
Education <= mediana
Financial literacy 1.985*** 9.426**
(0.628) (3.747)
Client of PattiChiari 0.256*** 2.412**
(0.044) (0.998)
N. of observations 2563 2563 2563 2563
F-test on the excluded instr. 33.677
Education > median
Financial literacy 3.034*** 7.333
Client of PattiChiari 0.127*** 0.928
(0.046) (1.110)
N. of observations 2122 2122 2122 2122
F-test on the excluded instr. 7.542
Age < 60b
Financial literacy 1.544** 5.154
(0.769) (6.261)
Client of PattiChiari 0.167*** 0.860
(0.044) (1.096)
N. of observations 2419 2419 2419 2419
F-test on the excluded instr. 14.507
Age 60+
Financial literacy 2.665*** 10.309**
(0.709) (4.032)
Client of PattiChiari 0.256*** 2.635**
(0.048) (1.121)
N. of observations 2367 2367 2367 2367
F-test on the excluded instr. 28.385
Low education, age 60+
Financial literacy 1.722** 12.595**
(0.808) (5.153)
Client of PattiChiari 0.232*** 2.918**
(0.052) (1.204)
N. of observations 1647 1647 1647 1647
F-test on the excluded instr. 19.857
Notes: the table reports OLS, first-stage, intention-to-treat, and instrumental variable results of the model wip = α˜+ β˜flip +Xipγ˜ + λp + εip
where wip is financial assets owned by household i, living in province p, in year 2010; flip is financial literacy of the household head, Xip
is a vector of household controls, and λp is a province fixed effect. Financial literacy is instrumented with a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the
province level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
a: This group includes respondents with compulsory schooling (years of education lower or equal to 8).
b: 60 is the median age in our baseline sample.
Table 6: Effect of financial literacy on financial assets growth between 2002 and 2006 or 2008 or
2010.
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. ass. growth Fin. lit. Fin. ass. growth Fin. ass. growth
Financial literacy 0.020** 0.160**
(0.007) (0.068)
Client of PattiChiari 0.133*** 0.021**
(0.027) (0.009)
N. of observations 3181 3181 3181 3181
F-test of excluded instruments 23.254
Notes: Each column reports estimates of a separate regression. OLS, ITT and IV columns are regression where the dependent variable is
(yitp−yi2002p−E[yitp−yi2002p])√
V ar(yitp−yi2002p)
, i.e. standardized growth in financial assets between 2002 and time t for household i in province p. FS
columns are regressions where the dependent variable is financial literacy. All models include the same vector of household controls: age, age
squared, gender, marital status and years of education of the household head; number of household components, household labour income,
size of the municipality and financial assets in 2002. All models include year-specific province fixed effects. In IV columns, financial literacy is
instrumented with a dummy that takes the value 1 if the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and 0 otherwise. Financial
literacy is the number of correct answers out of the two common across waves. SHIW repeated cross-section 2006-2010. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 7: Propensity Score Matching: Estimates
OLS FS ITT IV
Dependent variable: Fin. assets Fin. lit. Fin. assets Fin. assets
Panel A : Baseline model on common support
Financial literacy 2.289*** 8.550***
(0.629) (3.005)
Client of PattiChiari 0.233*** 1.996***
(0.036) (0.724)
F-test excluded instr. 43.216
N. of observations 4829
Panel B: Propensity score model controls on common support
Financial literacy 2.180*** 7.933***
(0.629) (3.044)
Client of PattiChiari 0.221*** 1.751**
(0.035) (0.695)
F-test excluded instr. 38.917
N. of observations 4829
Notes: Each column reports estimates of a separate regression. OLS, ITT and IV columns are regressions where the dependent variable is
financial assets. FS columns are regressions where the dependent variable is financial literacy. All models include the same vector of household
controls: age, age squared, gender, marital status and years of education of the household head; number of household components, household
labour income, reasons for choosing the main bank and size of the municipality. All models include province fixed effects. In IV columns,
financial literacy is instrumented with a dummy that takes the value 1 if the household’s main bank belongs to the PattiChiari Consortium and
0 otherwise. SHIW 2010. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8: Bank Costs by PattiChiari Status - Year 2010 (euro)
Type Basic Debit Credit Avg. Cost Avg. Cost Avg. Cost Avg. Cost Obs
of Bank Account Card Card Bank Transf. Bank Transf. of Withdrawal of Withdrawal
Fees Fees Fees (desk) (online) (desk) (ATM)
non-Patti-Chiari 35.94 6.38 5.98 2.43 0.38 0.08 6.28 844
(27.6) (5.31) (15.59) (7.00) (2.16) (0.70) (21.77)
Patti-Chiari 36.11 3.32 5.72 2.23 0.70 0.26 6.02 5889
(37.23) (6.19) (12.92) (7.16) (3.67) (2.14) (20.03)
Welch t-test stat. 0.06 -2.38 -0.97 0.42 1.28 1.40 -0.96
(p-value) (0.95) (0.02) (0.33) (0.67) (0.20) (0.16) (0.34)
Source: Bank of Italy Survey on Bank Fees and Expenditures. Notes: an observation is an individual bank account. Due to confidentiality reasons, for each bank, only means and standard
deviations of each variable has been provided, together with the number of bank accounts surveyed. The means and standard deviations provided in this table are, thus, combined
assuming observations are independent between banks. The Welch t-test for equality of means between PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks assumes unequal standard deviations between
the two groups. We report two-sided p-values.
Table 9: Bank Total Assets, Number of Branches, and PattiChiari status in 2010
Bank Name PattiChiari Total Assets No. of Decile Decile
(mln) Branches by Assets by Branches
UniCredit 1 929488 11266 10 10
Intesa Sanpaolo 1 658757 4060 10 10
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 1 244279 4677 10 10
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 1 98022 1847 10 10
Banca Popolare del Mezzogiorno 1 60515.92 174 10 4
Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 1 58498 429 10 6
Banca Popolare di Milano 1 54053 703 10 8
Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza 1 46339 1082 9 9
BancoPosta 0 43223.27 7700 9 10
Banca Carige 1 40010 807 9 9
Banca Popolare di Vicenza 1 35533 520 9 7
Veneto Banca 0 33057 335 9 6
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze 1 31677 637 9 8
Credito Emiliano 1 29998 976 9 9
Banca Popolare di Verona-S. Geminiano e S. Prospero 1 29689 2153 8 10
Banco di Napoli 1 28153 2424 8 10
Credito Valtellinese 1 26761 164 8 3
Banca Popolare di Sondrio 0 26282 336 8 6
Deutsche Bank 1 24859 358 8 6
Banca Popolare di Bergamo 1 24456 957 8 9
Banca delle Marche 1 21486 501 8 7
Cassa di Risparmio del Veneto 1 19625 1000 7 9
Banca Popolare di Lodi 1 19556 1175 7 9
Banco di Brescia 1 17622 738 7 8
Banca Popolare di Novara 1 17075 1205 7 9
Banco di Sardegna 1 13930 550 7 7
Unipol Banca 0 12052 332 7 6
Banca Mediolanum 1 11622 6 7 1
FinecoBank Banca 1 11250 3 6 1
Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio 0 10903 304 6 5
Cassa di risparmio in Bologna 1 10161 596 6 8
Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria 1 10130 598 6 8
Aletti and Co. 0 9940 42 6 1
Banca Carime 1 9784 700 6 8
Banca Fideuram 1 9556 108 6 2
Banca Popolare di Ancona 1 9101 310 5 6
Banca Popolare FriulAdria 1 8501 313 5 6
Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano 0 8210 198 5 5
Banco di Desio e della Brianza 0 8163 166 5 4
Banca Regionale Europea 1 8132 569 5 8
Banca Sella 1 7979 528 5 7
Cassa di risparmio di Ferrara 0 7573 170 5 4
Banca Popolare di Bari 0 7286 221 4 5
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Roma 0 7259 152 4 3
Cassa di risparmio di Asti 0 6118 210 4 5
Banca dell’ Adriatico 1 5613 463 4 7
Cassa di risparmio della provincia di Teramo 0 5489 187 4 4
Banca Di Credito Sardo 1 5401 117 4 2
Banca Popolare dell’Alto Adige 0 5248 140 4 3
Banca della Campania 1 5155 210 3 5
Cassa dei Risparmi di Forli e della Romagna 1 4769 171 3 4
Banca Nuova 1 4711 135 3 3
Cassa di risparmio di Venezia 1 4650 434 3 7
Cassa di Risparimio di Rimini 0 4551.51 179 3 4
Cassa di Risparmio di Biella e Vercelli 1 4523 211 3 5
Banca Popolare di Puglia e Basilicata 1 4460 191 3 5
Banca Agricola Popolare di Ragusa 0 4388 101 2 2
Cassa di Risparmio del Friuli Venezia Giulia 1 4300 447 2 7
Credito Siciliano 1 4059 157 2 3
SpA-Generbanca 1 3808 70 2 1
Cassa di risparmio della provincia di Chieti 1 3574 116 2 2
Banca Popolare Pugliese 1 3263 103 2 2
Banca Popolare di Spoleto 1 3029 165 2 4
Banca Monte Parma 0 3005 91 1 2
Cassa di risparmio di San Miniato 0 2986 132 1 2
IW Bank 0 2874 2 1 1
Banca di Piacenza 0 2793 62 1 1
Allianz Bank 0 2769 19 1 1
Cassa di risparmio di Pistoia e della Lucchesia 1 2515 145 1 3
Cassa di risparmio della Spezia 1 2055 152 1 3
Notes: data from Bankscope, Bank of Italy - SIOTEC database, and PattiChiari Consortium.
